From sewing looms to tractors and calculators, humanity’s economic history tells us that our labour is continually augmented or replaced by machines which can do the same job–but faster, cheaper, better, and safer. We are entering an age of unprecedented expansion in technological capabilities, led by advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. Sci-fi is rapidly becoming sci-non-fi. To quote ChatGPT’s creator Sam Altman, “The technological progress we make in the next 100 years will be far larger than all we’ve made since we first controlled fire and invented the wheel.” In the near future there is a possibility, which I posit as being very large, of complete economic redundancy of human labour. This article will discuss the technical case for this inevitability, what the impacts will be, and explore the alternatives of how our society could culturally, economically, and politically restructure in this post-labour economy.

The history of human technology is one of harnessing natural processes, of creating machines to do useful work. First, humans harnessed fire to cook, reducing the need for extensive chewing. From then on, the downward motion of rivers, the winds caused by atmospheric pressure, steam from heating water, and other natural phenomena were worked with in such a way that human labour could exit the productive process. But there is also the mechanism of augmentation, characterised by levers, gears, and spinning jetties, which multiply the fruits of our efforts. In both cases, these advancements increase economic productivity. These two forms of technological advancement are classically differentiated as capital-augmenting and labour-augmenting. Labour augmenting technologies increase the value of a worker; an accountant is better with Excel, and wages theoretically increase because of this. On the flip side, skill requirements may increase, squeezing out those who cannot keep up. Capital-augmenting technologies commonly substitute for labour; a Nike robot replaces the cobbler. This can lead to decreasing wages as demand for labour wanes, although the designers of these machines will become more valuable, again creating inequality and a need to up-skill. Since the industrial revolution, it has usually been observed that technological progress benefits capital and labour in roughly equal proportions, giving rise to large increases in real wages [1]. But recently, and especially going forward, this may not be the case.

The frontier of automation is always advancing. To me, the two most relevant technologies on our doorstep are AI and robotics. At their current stage these technologies are more labour-augmenting, and they are not that great. But this field is rapidly advancing, and on the horizon I see extremely competent technologies which will eventually be capital-augmenting. Why is this? In terms of economics, a human can be modelled as a function (a rule that maps inputs to outputs). If machine learning can emulate or surpass our function for a certain task, the hardware for sensing and actuating is sufficient, and if enough machines can be created, then our labour will be replaced. It will simply be economically untenable to have humans in some jobs. As well as being able to execute the function, for many tasks or roles, a disembodied software agent or embodied robot will be better, faster, cheaper, and safer. Importantly, robots don’t need sleep, a human resources department, benefits, or sick leave, and a recruiter isn’t needed to acquire them. Clearly, robots will have to be maintained, managed, and powered. Initially, they will be slightly cheaper than human labour, but over time, the running cost will essentially approach zero. Later in this article, the implications of these lower costs will be expanded on (hint: stuff will be way cheaper).

Many assumptions and conditions are required for this situation to occur, and it may occur to varying degrees, in different domains, or affect only some groups. It is also hard to predict things like this; who would have thought AI would first be doing art, then writing, and be useless in the physical world? Personally, I am optimistic about how we will navigate these coming changes, despite being unsure of how radical they will be. The rest of this article will explore the impacts of this theoretical economic redundancy of labour and how humanity could reshape itself in such a post-labour economy.

On pondering this scenario, the first question that comes to mind is, “Will no one have jobs anymore?”, followed by a fear of fascist, totalitarian states seizing power or visions of utopian luxury space communism–depending on your temperament. I will discuss both strands and the space in-between, but first, let us differentiate between the economic redundancy of labour and humans having no jobs.

The bottom line is that there will still be demand for goods and services provided by humans. Anton Korinek, a prominent voice in this emerging conversation, conceptualises the following categories of careers that will remain, as in [1]:

1. Statutory jobs in law, medicine, or politics, that will remain for legal reasons;

2. Meaning jobs such as those related to religious, spiritual, moral, personal guidance or other such fields, as well as social commentators like “influencers” and content creators;

3. Experience jobs like massage, sex work, tour guides, ski instructors, or sommeliers;

4. Care jobs such as nursing and caregiving;

5. Sentimental jobs including elected officials and religious figures.

These can be broadly differentiated into meaning roles and statutory roles: those that require human connection, or–dare I say in a scientific publication–a soul on the other end, and those that do not. We are social beings, we live in a story, we wish to partake in the arts, and in communal action, and so on. These things are not optional; mere cessation of desire and material abundance is insufficient to sustain us. While a human priest or tour guide may become more expensive, the previously mentioned holy grail of being “better, faster, cheaper, and safer” may never be achieved. It must be said that it is plausible that imitations of the described characteristics may develop to a point where meaning jobs could be at risk, to varying levels. For example, AI tutors and sex robots will exist, but in my estimation the replication of human idiosyncrasy and imperfection will never be perfect, leaving a market for humans to work in these meaning and statutory jobs.

Could we survive on the income from these roles alone? Maybe, but let us first consider the pessimistic scenario where we cannot. It is plausible that most will not be able to survive on their labour income alone. As a result, individuals will require personal sources of income from investment, distributed capital ownership, or benefit payments. So, how could such a system be set up?

Clearly, economic and political change will have to happen. This will be difficult and probably messy. No one, and of course not I, has a simple answer for this. Communism’s track record isn’t so great, and under free market capitalism, some may drown in the wave of automation. There are some options, but in designing political and economic systems, the theoretically plausible often unfolds into the hellish. In any case, caution and critical analysis is required. With that in mind, let’s discuss potential pathways.

The common thread among options is distributed ownership. In a world where labour becomes almost obsolete and capital (for more automation machinery) simultaneously becomes more valuable, those who possess the machines control the primary industry and, consequently, hold the keys to survival. Centralisation of capital ownership in this scenario of labour obsolescence relies on the kindness of overlords for sustenance, as there is no mutual dependence. That’s a game I don’t want to play. So, what system can we create? Through either human or automated coordination, an organisation owned in a decentralised fashion could be governed by, and provide income to, all shareholders. This organisation could own the robots, the data centres, and–with or without human labour–produce value in the form of goods and services. An ecosystem of these organisations, as well as individuals or small groups in connection with statutory jobs, could operate even better than our current economy in a libertarian fashion of non-compliance. Sam Altman, the CEO of OpenAI, presents the concept of the American Equity Fund [2]. It would be supported by taxing corporations above a certain valuation 2.5% of their market value each year, payable in shares distributed to the fund, and by taxing privately-held land, payable in dollars. The fund would annually distribute shares and dollars to all citizens over the age of 18. In his words, “People would be entrusted to use the money however they needed or wanted–for better education, healthcare, housing, starting a company, whatever...” A strategy like this aligns incentives well, but, of course, has flaws of the kind discussed earlier–dependence on overlord generosity.

In any case, the system transition phase will be difficult, and ensuring economic agency will be vital. More minds must begin thinking about how to navigate this. To conclude, I will explore more utopian outcomes, a potential meaning crisis, and how culture may adapt.

Labour is a significant business expense, and in an economic environment which substitutes paying salaries for paying electricity bills, expenses will clearly be lower. In a free market, lower costs for production will theoretically lead to lower consumer prices. It is unclear how much cheaper goods and services will get if our technology is sufficiently effective. Beyond eliminating labour, by speculating about the impact of positive feedback loops in this scenario, one can see the cost of every step in complex supply chains decreasing. An example of a positive feedback loop could be increasingly intelligent models accelerating scientific progress, which in turn creates greater models, ad infinitum. The point at which this feedback loop commences is called the singularity. To look at a practical and impactful example, consider how cheap food could become if agricultural knowledge accelerates, electricity costs are near zero, and the whole farming process from head to tail is automated, without involving human labour. It is not preposterous to suggest that in the coming decades, housing, food, healthcare, and other goods and services will decrease in cost drastically. Costs decreasing is the general historical trend under free market capitalism, and in this scenario, the rate of decrease would explode. A post-scarcity, low-cost environment may emerge.

To bring together these threads into a coherent finality, let’s touch back on income. Optimistically, income from meaning or statutory jobs will never be completely replaced, and individuals will still have the capacity to make investments in capital. With the income from a meaning or statutory job, combined with returns on investments, one could earn enough to survive and thrive because goods and services are drastically cheaper. Provided things get sufficiently cheap, as we earn less, real wages will be maintained, and in such a scenario, they will likely increase! Obviously in this scenario, more free time will be available. We may have more disposable income, and certainly on the surface our quality of life will be better... or can we be so sure?

As previously mentioned, the mere satisfaction of material desires does not constitute well-being. To give an extreme and saddening example, New Zealand has the second highest youth suicide rate in the developed world [3]. But compared to past times and potential alternative circumstances, we are in a great position technologically and materially. Of course, this is not a new idea. It is religiously and philosophically universal. So why is this important and how is it relevant to a post-labour economy? With the loss of non-economic value (social, purpose, etc.) given to employees and entrepreneurs through work, a large deficit in attention, time, purpose, and meaning will be created. Optimistically, an opportunity for great positive change will arrive. A focus on community, social connection, art, spiritual matters, beauty, and similar fields could arise.

To ground and finalise the conversation, let’s ponder more practical questions. How will we, as individuals and as a collective, change to focus on those problems that cannot be solved through technology and materials, such as those contributing to New Zealand’s suicide rate? How will the cultural and social value of hard work and conscientiousness be replaced? These are open questions, and my personal limitations and the practical constraints of this article are significant. I hope, as a reader, you are satisfied with me leaving you these questions to ponder.